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NO WAY, USA!: THE LACK OF A REPATRIATION
AGREEMENT WITH CUBA AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Annasofia A. Roig*
ABSTRACT
Cuba and the United States have had a tumultuous relationship for over
five decades now. Since the Revolution in Cuba, Cuban citizens have been
immigrating to the United States in large numbers, including through two
Cuban government-sponsored mass exoduses in 1980 and 1994. Throughout
that time, the Cuban government refused to negotiate with the United States
for the return of its citizens. Because of the lack of diplomatic relations, the
two nations did not have a repatriation agreement in place and no agreedupon mechanism existed by which the United States could return Cuban
citizens to the island nation. As such, the United States was left with no
alternative but to implement the wet foot-dry foot policy in 1995. Following
the reestablishment of relations between Cuba and the United States,
President Obama repealed wet foot-dry foot as a condition of the newlyestablished repatriation agreement. Finally, Cuba agreed to take back its
citizens who either attempted to enter the United States illegally or were
deportable from the United States for some other reason. After his election in
2016, President Trump took a harsh stance on Cuban policy and reversed
some of President Obama’s changes. This led to a strong response from the
Cuban government and created an uncertain future for the newly-established
repatriation agreement.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Cuba is “the most recalcitrant country on repatriation of its nationals.”1
For decades, Cubans were able to migrate to the United States and remain in
the country for two main reasons. The first was the lack of a deportation
mechanism, which would have permitted the United States to send many
Cuban nationals back to the island upon commission of deportable offenses.
The second reason, which resulted as a consequence of the first reason, was
President Bill Clinton’s wet foot-dry foot policy implemented in 1995.
In 1980 and again in 1994, the government headed by Fidel Castro
condoned two mass exoduses of Cubans to the United States.2 Because of
these government-sponsored evacuations, the United States was facing
higher numbers of immigrants than it could handle and had no mechanism
by which it could send these Cuban nationals back to their homeland.3 As
such, prior to the implementation of wet foot-dry foot in 1995, the United

1 Hearing on Repatriation of Convicted Criminal Aliens Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (written statement of Michele Thoren Bond, Assistant
Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of State) [hereinafter Written Statement of Michele Thoren
Bond].
2 ALEJANDRO PORTES & ALEX STEPICK, CITY ON THE EDGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MIAMI
103 (1993); Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 39–40 (1999).
3 See Jefferson Morley, Frequently Asked Questions: U.S.-Cuba Migration Policy, WASH. POST
(July
27,
2007,
3:02
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072701493.html.
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States made several attempts to negotiate repatriation agreements with Cuba.4
The Cuban government, however, repeatedly refused to take its citizens back,
leaving the United States with no real choice but to keep these Cuban
nationals.5 Eventually, following further negotiations between the Clinton
Administration and Castro, the Cuban government conceded that it would
take back only future Cuban nationals who fled the island but were
intercepted at sea by the United States Coast Guard.6 Once again, Cuba
refused to take back any other potentially deportable Cuban nationals.7 As a
result, the United States made a public announcement that any Cuban who
arrived on American soil would be permitted to remain.8 While this was a
seemingly benevolent, altruistic policy, it was actually implemented by the
Administration in light of the fact that it had no alternative course of action
for removing the Cuban immigrants who arrived in the United States.
Following President Barack Obama’s reestablishment of diplomatic ties with
Cuba and the repeal of wet foot-dry foot, the two nations were able to come
to an agreement regarding the repatriation of Cuban citizens who fled the
island.9 This agreement has been beneficial to the United States inasmuch as
it has alleviated the immigration influxes. However, given President Donald
Trump’s harsh stance on Cuba, it is unlikely that relations between the two
countries will remain the same. This will likely lead to the return of the days
where Cuba refused to accept its citizens back from the United States.
This article begins by briefly laying out the history of relations between
the United States and Cuba, as well as a brief history of the immigration laws
and policies that the United States has typically enforced against Cuban
nationals. The article then discusses the two primary reasons why Cuban
immigrants have been treated differently than immigrants from all other
countries—(1) the lack of a deportation/repatriation agreement between the
United States and Cuba, and (2) wet foot-dry foot. To that end, the article
explores the reasoning behind the implementation of wet foot-dry foot and
its effectiveness, as well as the explanations provided by the Cuban
government in refusing to accept back its deportable nationals from the

4 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Flight from Cuba; Clinton Will Open Talks with Cuba on Refugee
Crises, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/world/flight-from-cubaclinton-will-open-talks-with-cuba-on-refugee-crisis.html.
5

See id.

6

Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (May 2, 1995), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-with-the-republiccuba-normalization-migration.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
7

Id.

8

Id.

9

See
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
JOINT
STATEMENT
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Joint%20Statement%20FINAL%20%20US%20alt.pdf.

1

(2017),
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United States. In furtherance of those goals, the article will evaluate the wet
foot-dry foot policy, both as it was written and as it was implemented. The
article will also discuss President Obama’s repeal of wet foot-dry foot and
the implementation of a repatriation agreement that followed shortly
thereafter. This agreement will be explored further and compared to
repatriation agreements between the United States and other countries.
Finally, the article will examine President Trump’s possible changes to the
United States’ policies on Cuban deportation and the potential effects of his
policies on Cubans currently in the United States as well as on the current
repatriation agreement.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS
Prior to the Cuban Revolution and following the end of the SpanishAmerican War in 1898, the United States and Cuba had a more or less
cooperative relationship.10 The United States granted Cuba its independence
and assisted Cuba by quashing rebellions and investing in the island’s
economy.11
In January of 1959, Fidel Castro staged a coup d’état and seized power
from the Batista regime.12 The United States initially supported this coup and
placed an arms embargo against President General Batista, facilitating
Castro’s rise to power.13 Shortly thereafter, Cuba aligned itself with the
Soviet Union, which began to strain relations between the United States and
Cuba.14 By the following year, Castro had already “seized private land,
nationalized hundreds of private companies—including several local
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations—and taxed American products so heavily
that U.S. exports were halved in just two years.”15
Then, in October of 1960, nearly two years after Fidel Castro seized
power in Cuba, President Eisenhower placed the first economic embargo on

10 Claire
Suddath,
U.S.-Cuba
Relations,
TIME
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html.
11

(Apr.

15,

2009),

Id.

12

Bryan Logan, How Fidel Castro Rose to Power and Ruled Cuba for 5 Decades, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 13, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/fidel-castros-life-and-rise-to-power-2015-1.
13
14

Suddath, supra note 10.

Castro
and
the
Cold
War,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/.

PBS

(2005),

15 Suddath, supra note 10; see Merrill Fabry, The U.S. Trade Embargo on Cuba Just Hit 55 Years,
TIME (Oct. 19, 2015), http://time.com/4076438/us-cuba-embargo-1960/.
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Cuba.16 The following year, all diplomatic relations between the United
States and Cuba were severed.17 The break in diplomatic relations was
followed by numerous attempts to oust Castro, including the Bay of Pigs and
the Cuban missile crisis.18 Since that time, the relationship between the two
countries has been tenuous and strained. In 2013, President Obama and Raul
Castro stunned the world when they shook hands, marking only the second
time in fifty years that the leaders of the United States and Cuba had shaken
hands.19 A year later, there was a shift in the dealings between the two
countries when President Obama and Raul Castro began working to
normalize U.S.-Cuba relations.20 In furtherance of that goal, in March of
2014, President Obama became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba
in eighty-eight years.21
III. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-CUBA IMMIGRATION POLICIES
In October of 1965, with the Statue of Liberty beside him, thenPresident Lyndon B. Johnson addressed the nation to announce that the
United States would accept Cubans fleeing the Castro regime in search of
freedom.22 President Johnson’s priority was the reunification of families.23
He made the announcement in response to several comments by then-Prime
Minister Fidel Castro that Cubans seeking to leave the island for the United
States would not suffer any consequences.24 Following this announcement by
the president, Congress decided that it was required to act or the rest of the
world would come to believe that the United States does not mean what it
says.25 Congress then enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (“CAA”).

16 Greg Myre, The U.S. And Cuba: A Brief History of a Complicated Relationship, NPR (Dec. 17,
2014, 2:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/12/17/371405620/the-u-s-and-cuba-a-briefhistory-of-a-tortured-relationship.
17

Id.

18

Id.; Castro and the Cold War, supra note 14; Logan, supra note 12.

19

Myre, supra note 16.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Robert B. Semple, Jr., U.S. to Admit Cubans Castro Frees; Johnson Signs New Immigration
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1965, at 1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1965/10/04/archives/us-toadmit-cubans-castro-frees-johnson-signs-new-immigration-bill.html.
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Adjustment of Status for Cuban Refugees: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 of the
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 11–12 (1966).
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Until that point, in the mid-1960s, the majority of the immigrants from
Cuba were well-educated, hard-working professionals.26 This lead Castro to
cancel all flights from Cuba to the United States, in an effort to re-stabilize
the island’s social structure.27 Then, in 1980, Fidel Castro opened up the port
of Mariel, Cuba, in an effort to cause an exodus of Cuban people to come to
the United States.28 But this group of immigrants was different than the
groups that had come to the United States in years prior. Castro sent over
people that he considered “scum,” including prisoners whom he released
specifically to send to the United States.29 These individuals were welcomed
into the United States under President Jimmy Carter’s “open hearts and open
arms policy,” based on the CAA, which allowed Cuban immigrants to find
refuge from the political persecution they were facing in Cuba.30
Fourteen years after the Mariel exodus, Castro attempted to recreate the
scenario.31 In 1994, he once again permitted Cubans to leave for the United
States.32 However, these individuals made the journey to the United States
on rafts created out of anything they could find that would float and support
them.33 President Bill Clinton realized how dangerous the journey these
individuals were making truly was and wanted to send a message to the
Cuban government to stop them from leaving in this fashion.34 Tens of
thousands of the refugees were stopped at sea by U.S. Coast Guard officials,
banned from the United States by President Clinton, and taken to
Guantanamo Bay.35 Fidel Castro regularly spoke out against the CAA stating
that it was deliberately formulated by the United States’ government as an
attack on the Cuban people and society designed to “provoke death and
suffering.”36 The Cuban government highlighted the different treatment of
Cubans as compared to Haitians and Dominicans in order to justify Castro’s
commentary.37 In combination, these criticisms and the unsafe nature of the

26 Berta Esperanza Hernánadez-Truyol, On Becoming the Other: Cubans, Castro, and Elian – A
LatCritical Analysis, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 687, 689–90 (2001).
27 Alberto J. Perez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cubans,
Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28 NOVA L. REV. 437, 445 (2004).
28

PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 2.

29

Id. at 21.

30

Perez, supra note 27.

31

Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 58 (1999).

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Greenhouse, supra note 4.

35

Id.

36

Anita Snow, Cuban Assembly Condemns Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jul. 13, 2000, at A12.

37

Id.
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immigrants’ travel methods brought about negotiations between Cuba and
the United States to develop an immigration plan.38
These negotiations lead to the development and implementation of the
unprecedented and unusual wet foot-dry foot policy in 1995.39 When the
United States announced the new policy, it also stated that the tens of
thousands of Cubans that had been stopped at sea and taken to Guantanamo
would be brought to the United States, but that the policy would change
moving forward.40 The policy was surprising to many because United States
ships had never returned Cubans “to their communist homeland.”41 While in
place, wet foot-dry foot was successful in preventing the “massive,
uncontrolled migration that the United States fear[ed]” following the 1980
and 1994 exoduses.42 Wet foot-dry foot remained in place for over two
decades.43
On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced his changes to the
policy toward Cuba.44 He explained the reasoning behind the policy change
stating, “[t]hrough these changes, we intend to create more opportunities for
the American and Cuban people, and begin a new chapter among the nations
of the Americas.”45 President Obama eased travel restrictions and the ability
of American citizens to send remittances to their Cuban relatives.46 The
policy change also made it possible for American citizens visiting Cuba to
utilize their debit and credit cards on the island.47 Further, the Administration,
in an effort to reestablish diplomatic relations, reopened the U.S. embassy in
Havana and agreed to have high-ranking officials visit the island.48

38

Greenhouse, supra note 4.

39

Javier Arteaga, Comment, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More than Forty Years Later a
Proposal for the Future, 3 FIU L. REV. 509, 529 (2008); Perez, supra note 27.
40 The Day When ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’ Became Policy and Changed Immigration, MIAMI HERALD
(Jan.
12,
2017,
6:14
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article126226584.html.
41

Id.

42

Morley, supra note 3.

43

Wet foot-dry foot was implemented, in its beginning stages, on May 2, 1995. Joint Statement
with the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 752 (May 2,
1995). The policy was repealed on January 12, 2017. Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration
Policy, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/12/statement-president-cuban-immigration-policy.
44 Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2014)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policychanges.
45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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Because of the improved relations between the two nations that were
fostered by his initial policy changes, in 2017 President Obama announced
the repeal of the wet foot-dry foot policy.49 In the statement announcing the
end of the infamous policy, President Obama said, “the United States is
taking important steps forward to normalize relations with Cuba and to bring
greater consistency to our immigration policy.”50 The very same day that he
made the announcement, the Department of Homeland Security ended wet
foot-dry foot and Cuban nationals who attempted to enter the United States
illegally and did not qualify for humanitarian aid were subject to
deportation.51 As a result of the change in policy, the Cuban government
“agreed to accept the return of Cuban nationals who ha[d] been ordered
removed, just as it ha[d] been accepting the return of migrants interdicted at
sea.”52
After taking office, President Trump quickly reversed many of the
changes made by President Obama, taking a harsh and hostile stance toward
Cuba once again.53 These drastic changes in such a short period of time had
a detrimental effect on the two countries’ diplomatic future. Cuba quickly
responded, taking an equally harsh stance against the United States and
emphasizing the magnitude of the mistake the United States was making.54
IV. U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO
CUBA
For many decades, the United States has treated Cuban immigrants
differently than immigrants from all other nations. Several of these
differences were codified into law while others were implemented as policy.
These parole laws and policies, which permitted unique treatment of Cuban
immigrants include, among others, (1) the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966
and the wet foot-dry foot policy, (2) exclusion from expedited removal, and
(3) the Cuban family reunification parole program.

49

Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, supra note 44.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

See Dan Merica, Trump Unveils New Restrictions on Travel, Business with Cuba, CNN
POLITICS (June 17, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/16/politics/trump-cubapolicy/index.html.
54

See Statement by the Revolutionary Government, REPRESENTACIONES DIPLOMÁTICAS DE CUBA
EXTERIOR (June 16, 2017), http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/articulo/statement-revolutionarygovernment.
EN EL

2019]

No Way, USA!

A.

883

The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and the Wet Foot-Dry Foot
Policy

Typically, individuals outside of the United States seeking refuge may
request parole status from the United States “based on humanitarian or
significant public benefit reasons.”55 Parole is temporary and is granted on a
case-by-case, discretionary basis.56 Under the Cuban Adjustment Act (the
“CAA”), which the United States’ Congress passed in 1966, the complex
process of applying for parole no longer applied to Cuban immigrants in the
same way.57 The CAA gave Cubans a special status in the United States
immigration process and incomparable access to the United States.58 This law
permitted Cuban nationals or citizens to apply for legal permanent resident
status, a green card, after living in the United States for just one year.59 This
remains true even if the Cuban individual arrived without a visa.60 At the time
that the CAA was enacted, the Cubans who would be permitted to apply to
adjust their status under this law did not have other means by which they
could seek residence.61
Beginning in 1995, when wet foot-dry foot went into effect, through
2017, when wet foot-dry foot was repealed, the parole policy toward Cuban
nationals was enforced even more differently than previously.62 Wet foot-dry
foot permitted Cuban immigrants who reached American soil (dry-foot) to
apply for parole, and legal permanent resident status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966, after having already arrived in the United States.63
55 Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United States,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarianor-significant-public-benefit-parole-individuals-outside-united-states.
56

Id.

57

See generally Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1996), which is published as a note to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255 (2012).
58

See Hernánadez-Truyol, supra note 26.

59

See Green Card for a Cuban Native or Citizen, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 10,
2018), https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/caa, for information concerning acquisition of green cards for
Cubans.
60

Arteaga, supra note 39.

61

Cuban Adjustment Act, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/cuban_adjustment_act.pdf.
62 Fact Sheet: Changes to Parole and Expedite Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals, U.S.
EMBASSY CUBA (Jan. 12, 2017), https://cu.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-changes-parole-expedite-removalpolicies-affecting-cuban-nationals/; Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals
Outside the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-or-significant-public-benefit-parole-individualsoutside-united-states.
63 Fact Sheet: Changes to Parole and Expedite Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals,
supra note 62.
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Individuals who were intercepted at sea (wet-foot) were either returned to
Cuba or taken to a third country.64
Some of the general impetuses for the wet foot-dry foot policy were
“Cuba’s brutal Communist dictatorship, proximity to the United States, and
history.”65 The Department of Homeland Security justified the different
treatment of Cubans as compared to other parole applicants because of
“certain unique circumstances, including conditions in Cuba, the lack of
diplomatic relations between our countries, and the Cuban Government’s
general refusal to accept the repatriation of its nationals.”66 The Obama
Administration’s decision to appeal stemmed from the improvement of
diplomatic relations between the countries, which began in December 2014.67
B.

Exclusion from Expedited Removal

Typically, the Department of Homeland Security “has the authority to
effectuate the removal of certain categories of individuals, including those
apprehended at ports of entry or near the border, through what is known as
expedited removal.”68 As a result of the other laws and policies in place with
regard to Cuban immigrants, however, “Cuban nationals were exempt from
being removed through expedited removal proceedings.”69
Given the improvements in relations between the two countries, thenSecretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, determined that this
exemption for Cuban nationals was no longer necessary.70 Thus, pursuant to
the Joint Statement, Cubans were no longer exempt from expedited removal
from the United States.71 As of the date of the announcement, “Cuban
nationals who are apprehended at ports of entry or near the border may be
placed into expedited removal proceedings in the same manner as nationals
of other countries.”72

64

Id.

65

Alex Nowrasteh, End to “Wet Feet, Dry Feet” is Good for Communist Cuba, Bad for Freedom.,
CATO INST. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-wet-feet-dry-feet-goodcommunist-cuba-bad-freedom.
66 Fact Sheet: Changes to Parole and Expedite Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals,
supra note 62, at 2 (emphasis added).
67

Id.

68

Id. at 3.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 1.

72

Id. at 3.
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The Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program

The Cuban family reunification parole program is the one program that
still remains in full force and effect.73 This program permits beneficiaries of
certain family-sponsored visas to come to the United States while they await
their visas, rather than having to wait in Cuba.74 The purpose of this program
is to discourage dangerous sea voyages and promote the safe reunification of
families.75 The Department of Homeland Security further stated that this
program “will remain in place because it serves other national interests.”76
V.

ANALYSIS

In the wake of the Mariel exodus, it became apparent to the Carter
Administration, and the United States as a whole, that while the general
sentiments of the CAA, President Johnson’s speech, and the Congressional
hearings during those time periods were valid, the United States could not
continue to accept the volume of Cuban refugees that were making their way
to the American borders.77 In fact, despite his open arms open hearts policy,
President Carter himself attempted to prevent the Mariel boatlifters from
arriving in the United States.78 Before welcoming the Cuban immigrants,
President Carter ordered their ships stopped and seized.79
Prior to and at the time of the implementation of wet foot-dry foot, the
United States did not have a mechanism or agreement under which it could
deport Cuban nationals. This is apparent from the fact that rather than simply
returning the roughly 12,000 people stopped in the 1994 exodus to Cuba, the
Clinton Administration was forced to take them to Guantanamo Bay.80 The
individuals were transported to the Cuban island, but not permitted on Cuban
territory. Instead, because of the broken relations between Cuba and the
United States, Clinton had no choice but to come up with a creative solution
to the growing problem. So, he elected to implement a policy of special
treatment for Cubans arriving in the United States, when, in reality, he did so
because he had no alternative for dealing with the Cuban nationals whom
Cuba refused to reaccept.
73

Id. at 4.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Arteaga, supra note 39; see PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 2, at 22.

78

Arteaga, supra note 39; see PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 2, at 22.

79

Arteaga, supra note 39; see PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 2, at 22.

80

Greenhouse, supra note 4.
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Throughout the entirety of the enforcement of wet foot-dry foot, it was
highly criticized by many different groups, for many different reasons, not
the least of which was the fact that Cuban immigrants were given preference
over immigrants from every other nation. Second, the policy is nothing more
than a legal fiction created as a temporary solution to a long-term problem.
The policy was not even uniformly reviewed by Cubans and those of
Cuban descent.81 When the wet foot-dry foot policy went into effect in 1995,
Cubans and Cuban-Americans living in the United States had mixed
emotions about the policy when it was first announced.82 On the one hand,
they were happy to welcome more Cubans to the United States.83 On the
other, they could not believe that the Clinton Administration was actually
planning on sending Cubans back to the island if detained while at sea.84
A.

Wet Foot-Dry Foot—A Legal Fiction and Temporary Solution

Just months before the announcement of wet foot-dry foot, the Clinton
Administration announced a separate deal with the Cuban government.85 At
the press conference announcing that arrangement, Attorney General Janet
Reno and Peter Tarnoff from the State Department made clear that at that
time the Administration was already grasping at straws for a solution.86 They
stated that President Clinton was forced to take “quick and decisive action
. . . in the hours and days following the outbreak of the crisis.”87 Clinton
“decided that all Cubans who entered this country illegally would no longer
be paroled into the United States.”88 He also decided to send the intercepted
immigrants to Guantanamo or third countries, because Cuba, at that time,
refused to accept them.89 Then, a few months later, the Clinton
Administration reneged on these statements and implemented wet foot-dry
foot.90 After continued negotiations, Cuba still refused to take back its
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See generally Attorney General Janet Reno and Peter Tarnoff, Under Sec’y of State for Political
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https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1994/09-09-1994-p.pdf).
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deportable citizens from the United States and agreed only to accepting those
that were intercepted at sea while attempting to flee.91
In negotiating with the Cuban government, President Clinton and his
administration could not get Castro to agree to a long-term solution to the
immigration problem the United States was facing.92 The most the Castro
regime would agree to was taking back the citizens that were intercepted at
sea prior to making it to the United States.93 As part of the arrangement, the
United States agreed to keep anyone who did in fact step foot on American
soil.94 This distinction was arbitrary and was merely part of a plan concocted
by the Clinton Administration to turn a bad situation into a positive.
There is no difference, in a legal sense, between a Cuban immigrant that
the U.S. Coast Guard stops out at sea or a Cuban immigrant whose body
makes contact with the American shore. For the United States government
under wet foot-dry foot, however, there was a big difference. The first
immigrant could be taken back to Cuba on a boat while the latter would stay
in the United States and more than likely would be applying for legal
permanent resident status within the year.
The Clinton Administration was hard-pressed to find a better
arrangement for the moment because the Cuban government had already
refused, for decades, to take back its citizens who fled the island. Knowing
this, the Clinton Administration surely performed a cost benefit analysis and
decided to agree to the Cuban government’s terms. This is likely the reason
why the United States decided to permit the 20,000 plus Cubans housed in
Guantanamo into the country despite President Clinton’s many public
statements to the contrary.95 The Administration needed the Cuban
government to agree to any arrangement that potentially meant not having to
accept every Cuban that was and would be fleeing Cuba.
B.

Repatriation Agreements

To repatriate someone means “to restore or return [them] to the[ir]
country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship.”96 In order for countries to be
able to deport someone to their country of origin, there must be a repatriation
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agreement in place between the two nations.97 Without any agreement of the
kind, the repatriating country is not required to accept its citizen or national
from the sending nation. It is commonplace for countries with good or neutral
diplomatic relationships to have repatriation agreements with one another.
Where no such agreement exists, deportation and repatriation are nearly
impossible given the lack of a mechanism by which to do so.
1.

Agreements Between the United States and Cuba

Prior to President Obama’s changes in 2017, the deportation of Cubans
from the United States and their repatriation in Cuba was sparse and
grounded in specific, limited agreements between the two nations. One such
example was the 1984 agreement in which Cuba affirmed that it would accept
back “2,746 Cuban criminals and mental patients who came here in the 1980”
Mariel boatlift.98 At the time of the 1984 agreement, White House officials
were hopeful that it would lead to the normalization of immigration from
Cuba to the United States.99 Just five months after the execution of the
agreement, Cuba suspended it.100 In 1986, the U.S. Government attempted,
unsuccessfully, to reinstate the agreement.101 Finally, the following year, in
1987, Cuba agreed to repatriate the remaining 2,500 deportation eligible
immigrants from the Mariel boatlift.102
On September 9, 1994, Cuba and the United States came to a second
migration agreement.103 According to both countries, the agreement was
necessary to “help to deter people from undertaking dangerous journeys on
unsafe boats and help to ensure that the migration between our two countries
is safe, legal, and orderly.”104 Under that agreement, the United States agreed
to (1) continue issuing visas to immediate relatives of United States citizens;
(2) continue issuing visas to 20,000 Cubans through visa and refugee
procedures, as well as the attorney general’s parole authority; and (3) for the
first year following the agreement, the United States would “authorize the
97 See generally Note on Voluntary Repatriation EC/SCP/13, UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Aug. 27, 1980), https://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68cce8/notevoluntary-repatriation.html.
98 Bernard Weinraub, U.S. and Cuba Gain an Accord on Repatriation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15,
1984), https://nyti.ms/2H0ND10.
99
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100
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legal migration of those Cubans currently on the immigrant visa waiting
list.”105 At the press conference announcing the agreement, a member of the
press asked Mr. Peter Tarnoff of the State Department about Cuba’s
willingness to repatriate its nationals at that time.106 In response, Mr. Tarnoff
stated merely that “Cuba ha[d] agreed to begin discussions about the manner
in which they will be returned through consul channels.”107 The remainder of
his response addressed successful voluntary returns and the individual asking
the question requested that he address the question in terms of “remittances
[on] other points.”108 Mr. Tarnoff then responded, “As you can see, that is
not part of the agreement, and nothing of that sort is contemplated.”109
Just eight months later, on May 2, 1995, the United States and Cuba
executed a new joint statement.110 This statement became known as the birth
of the wet foot-dry foot policy.111 The new agreement modified the
September 9, 1994, agreement, but did not replace it.112 Now, Cuba agreed
to take back all Cuban nationals intercepted at sea, as well as those who
entered Guantanamo illegally.113 Cuba further agreed that it would not
retaliate against the individuals who were returned after having attempted to
flee the country.114 After this third agreement between the two nations, Cuba
had still not agreed to repatriate all of the individuals that the United States
sought to deport back to the island.115
President Obama’s steps toward normalization of diplomatic relations
between the two countries facilitated the establishment of a fixed repatriation
agreement between the United States and Cuba.116 Today, the two nations
have an agreement in place whereby Cuba agreed to “accept and facilitate the
repatriation of Cuban nationals who are ordered removed from the United
States.”117 In their joint statement announcing the agreement, the two
countries announced that they were “[aware] of the necessity to facilitate
105
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regular migration to the benefit of both countries, and to discourage irregular
migration.”118 The agreement laid out in the joint statement was not meant to
alter any agreement set forth in the previous statements dated December 14,
1984, September 9, 1994, and May 2, 1995.119 The terms of these agreements
remain in place “with respect to the return of Cuban nationals intercepted at
sea by the United States [and] the return of migrants found to have entered
the Guantanamo Naval Base illegally.”120
As part of the 2017 agreement, the United States agreed to “apply to all
Cuban nationals . . . the same migration procedures and standards that are
applicable to nationals of other countries.”121 This, of course, meant the end
of the wet foot-dry foot policy.122 In return, Cuba committed to “beginning
the regular return of Cuban nationals” to the island of Cuba.123 The specific
terms of this unprecedented agreement are as follows:
1. From the date of this Joint Statement, the United States
of America, consistent with its laws and international
norms, shall return to the Republic of Cuba, and the
Republic of Cuba, consistent with its laws and
international norms, shall receive back all Cuban
nationals who after the signing of this Joint Statement
are found by the competent authorities of the United
States to have tried to irregularly enter or remain in that
country in violation of United States law.
The United States of America and the Republic of Cuba
state their intention to promote changes in their
respective migration laws to enable fully normalized
migration relations to occur between the two countries.
2. The United States of America and the Republic of Cuba
shall apply their migration and asylum laws to nationals
of the other Party avoiding selective (in other words,
discriminatory) criteria and consistent with their
international obligations.

118
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3. The United States of America shall continue ensuring
legal migration from the Republic of Cuba with a
minimum of 20,000 persons annually.
4. The United States of America and the Republic of Cuba,
determined to strongly discourage unlawful actions
related to irregular migration, shall promote effective
bilateral cooperation to prevent and prosecute alien
smuggling and other crimes related to migration
movements that threaten their national security,
including the hijacking of aircraft and vessels.
5. The Republic of Cuba shall accept that individuals
included in the list of 2,746 to be returned in accordance
with the Joint Communiqué of December 14, 1984, may
be replaced by others and returned to Cuba, provided
that they are Cuban nationals who departed for the
United States of America via the Port of Mariel in 1980
and were found by the competent authorities of the
United States to have tried to irregularly enter or remain
in that country in violation of United States law. The
Parties shall agree on the specific list of these individuals
and the procedure for their return.
6. The Republic of Cuba shall consider and decide on a
case-by-case basis the return of other Cuban nationals
presently in the United States of America who before the
signing of this Joint Statement had been found by the
competent authorities of the United States to have tried
to irregularly enter or remain in that country in violation
of United States law. The competent authorities of the
United States shall focus on individuals whom the
competent authorities have determined to be priorities
for return.
As from the date of signing of this Joint Statement, the
Parties shall carry out the necessary procedures for its
implementation. The Parties may meet and revise such
procedures from time to time to ensure effective
implementation.124
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Lastly, the countries agreed that officials from both the United States
and Cuba would be meeting regularly to ensure continued cooperation
between the nations and that the agreement is being properly carried out.125
Even though the Cuban government did not agree outright to accept all
deportable nationals, the agreement to consider each return on a case-by-case
basis represents significant progress. Additionally, this individualized
approach to repatriation cases is not uncommon.126 Most importantly,
however, a similar agreement has never before been executed between Cuba
and the United States, which is why, until this point, many otherwise
deportable Cuban nationals have remained in the United States. Today, those
same individuals face deportation and repatriation at the hands of this Joint
Statement.
As early as one month after the United States and Cuba came to an
agreement, 680 Cubans were returned to the island.127 The United States has
many Cuban immigrants that it would like to repatriate, but it had been unable
to do so until the culmination of its negotiations with Raul Castro.128 In fact,
over 28,400 Cubans were being held in the United States awaiting
deportation because the United States could not actually go through the
formal process of sending them back to the island.129 Since the change in
policy, Cubans have been turned away at the United States border, held in
United States “detention facilities awaiting rulings in their removal
proceedings,” and sent back to Cuba.130 The number of Cubans deported from
the United States in 2017, after the discontinuation of wet foot-dry foot and
the establishment of a rough repatriation agreement, doubled from the
previous year.131
While the agreement currently in place between Cuba and the United
States is not comprehensive, it is “a major step toward the normalization of
their migration relations.”132 The Cuban government agreed to receive all
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Cuban nationals who arrive in the United States after the execution of the
agreement.133 It also stated it would consider all other cases for deportation,
focusing on those who have been deemed a “priority for return.”134 Both of
these terms were previously unimaginable from Cuba, which has repeatedly
been “recalcitrant” to accepting its nationals.135
2.

Agreements Between the United States and Haiti

The group amongst which wet foot-dry foot has been least popular is the
Haitian population.136 Haiti is a poverty-stricken nation riddled with
“dangerous conditions caused by armed conflict, natural disasters or other
extraordinary circumstances.”137 Like the Cubans who make the voyage to
the United States on unsafe rafts, countless Haitians risk their safety to come
here in search of a better life. Because of the terrible living conditions in their
home country, many Haitians have been fighting for decades to obtain, at
minimum, temporary protected status.138 The disparity in treatment between
the Cubans and Haitians is particularly obvious in South Florida.139
Contemporaneously with the Mariel exodus of 1980, many Haitians also fled
their homeland in search of improved living conditions in the United
States.140 However, unlike their Cuban counterparts, the Haitian immigrants
were not eligible for an adjustment of status to legal permanent resident.141
Then, for some time in the 1990s, Haitians were being taken to Guantanamo
Bay for asylum processing and possible parole screenings.142 Shortly
thereafter, upon realizing the volume of Haitian immigrants seeking refuge,
President George H. W. Bush ordered all Haitian ships carrying immigrants
to be stopped immediately by the United States Coast Guard.143 Pursuant to

133 Id. at 2; see Nora Gámez Torres, More Than 37,000 Cubans Face Deportation Orders, MIAMI
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President Bush’s announcement, all of these Haitians were to be returned to
their country for repatriation.144
Under President Clinton, this policy changed, and Haitians who were
intercepted by the United States Coast Guard were taken to other countries
in the region while they were considered for refugee status.145 A few weeks
later, President Clinton rescinded this policy, citing the high number of
Haitians attempting to come to the United States.146 The policy for Haitian
immigrants then became one of “safe havens” whereby they would be
transported to nearby countries for refugee processing, only to be denied and
never received by the United States.147 Haitians that arrived successfully,
albeit illegally, in the United States remained subject to expedited removal
proceedings at all times, unlike their Cuban counterparts.148
Following the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the Department of
Homeland Security granted Temporary Protected Status to the Haitian
people.149 There have been several extensions to the Haitian Temporary
Protected Status since then in light of the continued hardships that the island
nation has faced. The Trump Administration announced that the Haitian TPS
status will end in July 2019.150
The United States’ government historically explained the difference in
treatment of the immigrant populations by explaining that “Cubans are
political refugees while the Haitians are fleeing here purely for economic
reasons.”151 But, that is simply untrue. Some Haitian immigrants certainly
flee their country in search of economic opportunity, but many, especially in
the early 1990s, fled following a military coup d’état that deposed the
country’s democratically elected government.152
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Agreements Between the United States and Other Countries

Similar to Cuba, Vietnam did not have an agreement with the United
States for many years.153 Until January 22, 2008, Vietnam did not need to
accept deportees from the United States.154 Of note is the fact that the United
States and Vietnam resumed diplomatic relations on July 12, 1995, but a
comprehensive agreement was not executed between the two nations until
January 22, 2008, almost thirteen years later. The agreement with Vietnam
lays out the conditions for repatriation, the individuals who are eligible for
repatriation, the acceptance of these individuals, and several logistical facts
such as expenses and procedures.155 The agreement provides that individuals
who violate the laws of the United States will be considered for repatriation
by the government of Vietnam.156 The individual must (1) be a citizen of
Vietnam, (2) have resided previously in Vietnam, (3) broken a U.S. law and
ordered removed by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (4) complete any
prison sentence prior to removal.157
Unlike Vietnam and Cuba, Mexico has had an agreement of some kind
in place with the United States for a long time. The relationship between the
United States and Mexico is far different from that between the United States
and Cuba. Officials from the United States’ and Mexican governments meet
annually at what they call the Repatriation Strategy and Policy Executive
Coordination Team (“RESPECT”) meeting.158 These two countries have a
longstanding arrangement and their focus today is on streamlining and
efficiency.159 They have nine separate, localized agreements covering all
parts of the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as a general agreement that covers
blanket procedures that apply to all repatriation bases along the border.160 The
general agreement stipulates the rights of the individuals being repatriated,
153 See Julia Preston, Vietnam Agrees to the Return of Deportees form the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/us/23immig.html.
154 See Vietnam-US Agreement on the Acceptance of the Return of Vietnamese Citizens, EMBASSY
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC VIETNAM (Jan. 24, 2008), http://vietnamembassy-usa.org/relations/vietnam-usagreement-acceptance-return-vietnamese-citizens.
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the processes for coordination of both nations, and the procedures by which
they will evaluate the effectiveness of the repatriation arrangement.161 Each
of the base-specific agreements addresses “location-specific information, and
specific measures for vulnerable populations, such as unaccompanied minors
and those with medical conditions.”162
C.

Consequences of Having Had No Repatriation Agreement with
Cuba

Certainly, there have been many consequences over the years of not
having a repatriation agreement in place with Cuba, some more quantifiable
than others. One often-referenced, measurable effect of the lack of a
deportation mechanism is the number of Cubans with criminal convictions
that the United States has been unable to remove.163 Over 28,400 Cubans
have been indefinitely awaiting deportation to Cuba.164 The United States has
expended many resources and funds in keeping these otherwise deportable
Cubans for years, as many of them must be supervised by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and others are in prison.165
The lack of a repatriation agreement was beneficial to the Cuban
government for several reasons. First, the wet foot-dry foot policy functioned
as a “safety valve” for the government.166 Many of the government’s
strongest oppositionists left the island out of fear of persecution and in search
of a better life.167 This, in part, guaranteed the continued hold of the
government over the people. Many were unclear why the Cuban government
agreed to give up this release valve.168 Perhaps, the government was
concerned given that a large portion of those who fled were young and made
up the workforce.169 Regardless of the reasoning, the policy change means
that the Cuban government will now be forced to face many critics who
would otherwise have fled the island for the United States.170
161 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., LOCAL ARRANGEMENT FOR REPATRIATION OF
MEXICAN NATIONALS (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/LRA-Base.pdf.
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Cuban Policy in the Post-Obama/Trump Era

Following Obama’s announcement of normalizing relations in 2014,
“[r]umors that the [wet foot-dry foot] policy would end have been rampant
in Cuba.”171 These rumors prompted a surge of Cuban immigrants to the
United States.172 Somewhat ironically, these immigrants used the policy that
was implemented following fears of additional mass exoduses from the
island. In 2014, 24,278 Cubans made it to the Unites States, in 2015, that
number nearly doubled, and in 2016, it exceeded 54,000.173 Despite these
large numbers of individuals that made it to American soil, in 2014, the
United States Coast Guard only stopped 2,059 people, and in 2015, that
number was roughly equally as low.174
Many Cubans were glad to see the end of the wet foot-dry foot policy,
including people who came to the United States from Cuba seeking refuge.175
The Cuban immigrants agree with the other immigrant populations in that
they state that the vast majority of immigrants are coming to the United States
for economic reasons, rather than political reasons.176 On those grounds, the
immigrants say, they should be treated no differently than Mexicans or
Central Americans attempting to come to the United States.177
The irony of the stated rationale for implementing the wet foot-dry foot
policy—to reduce the unsafe immigration of Cubans to the United States—
is that it was most successful after President Obama announced the end of
the policy.178 “The new policy has reduced by 64 percent the irregular
immigration of Cubans arriving in the U.S., according to the State
Department.”179 It has also reduced the number of individuals arriving on the
171 Alan Gomez, Obama Ends ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’ Policy for Cubans, USA TODAY (Jan. 12,
2017 4:31 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/12/obama-ends-wet-foot-dry-footpolicy-cubans/96505172/.
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United States’ shores by vessel.180 “In fiscal year 2017, the Coast Guard
intercepted 1,468 Cubans at sea, compared to 5,396 in fiscal year 2016.”181
And from October 1, 2017, through December 18, 2017, “the Coast Guard
intercepted just 44 Cubans.”182
Under President Trump, there has been an increase in the number of
people that have been deported to Cuba.183 As of December 9, 2017, “37,218
[Cubans were] facing final deportation orders.”184 This number will continue
to increase, as the popular access for legal immigration to the United States
was eliminated. Without wet foot-dry foot, Cubans have two available
options to achieve legal immigration status in the United States: (1) come to
the United States illegally, remain for over one year, and apply for adjustment
of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act; or (2) apply for a visa, 20,000 of
which are awarded annually, and enter the country legally.185
Just months after taking office, President Trump’s team reviewed and
reversed many of the policy changes implemented by the Obama
Administration. President Trump, like with most other matters handled by
President Obama, has taken a strong stance against President Obama’s
advances in normalizing U.S.-Cuba relations.186 He stated that the deal was
“one-sided” and ignored Cuba’s numerous human rights violations, which he
plans to work to expose.187 One of the aspects of President Obama’s changes
that President Trump chose not to undo was the repeal of wet foot-dry foot.188
As a result of President Trump’s harsh commentary on Cuba, many
economists and businesspeople are advising potential investors to “hit pause”
on planned ties with the island nation.189 The Castro regime immediately fired
back, in a very strongly-worded statement, that Trump’s decisions were “ill-

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Ordoñez & Gámez Torres, supra note 131; Morning Edition: Trump’s ICE Deportations Are
Up
from
Obama’s
Figures,
Data
Show,
NPR
(Jan.
23,
2018,
5:03
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/23/579884642/trumps-ice-deportations-increase-from-obamas-figuresdata-show.
184

Gámez Torres, supra note 133.

185

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 9 at 1–2.

186

See Merica, supra note 53.

187

Id.

188

Alicia Cohn, Trump Will Not Bring Back ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’ Cuba Policy, HILL (June 15,
2017, 9:00 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/338050-trump-will-not-bring-back-wetfoot-dry-foot-cuba-policy.
189 Should U.S. Companies Hit ‘Pause’ on Doing Business in Cuba?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(Apr. 20, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-business-should-hit-pause-on-new-u-scuba-ties/.

2019]

No Way, USA!

899

advised.”190 The Cuban government went on to call the policy change a
“backward step.”191 As it has done historically, the Cuban government further
stated that the U.S. has returned to its coercive practices, stagnated the Cuban
economy, and provoked “international condemnation” of the Cuban
nation.192 Despite this blemish on a seemingly improving relationship, the
repatriation of Cuban people from the United States has continued. Without
the reinstatement of wet foot-dry foot, “[d]etention or deportation is the new
reality for most Cubans who try to enter the United States without visas.”193
On November 8, 2017, some of President Trump’s policy changes were
implemented.194 He stated that his reasons for re-implementing the policies
in place before President Obama’s changes were to support the freedom of
the Cuban people, support those unfairly imprisoned, as well as to protect the
United States’ national security and foreign policy interests.195 A support of
the Cuban people and United States policy interests could lead Cuba to return
to its old ways and decline to continue honoring any repatriation agreements.
It is evident, given the Cuban government’s response to Trump’s
changes, that the Trump Administration will have detrimental effects on the
possibility of U.S-Cuba diplomatic relations.196 What remains to be seen, in
concrete terms, is what effect, if any, the inevitable future deterioration in
U.S.-Cuba relations will have on the deportation of Cuban nationals back to
the island. It is certain, however, that President Trump’s stance on Cuba will
have a negative impact on diplomatic relations. This will undoubtedly impact
Cuba’s willingness to repatriate its citizens from the United States, as the
Joint Statement makes clear, more than once, that the agreement reached
between the two countries is founded on and encouraged by the renewed and
“normalized” “bilateral relations.”197
Notably, the Trump Administration has not yet announced any plans to
sever diplomatic ties with Cuba.198 For now, diplomatic relations (and
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embassies) will remain open.199 “Trump said he is keeping the embassy open
‘in the hope that our countries can forge a much stronger and better path.’”200
So long as the Cuban government continues to see things the same way, this
could mean the ongoing steady deportation of Cuban nationals. Alternatively,
a decline in relations would likely mean a return of the days where the United
States was unable, as a matter of procedure, to deport Cubans back to Cuba.
Because President Trump’s stated reasons for the reversions are namely
a regime change and encouraging a democratic government in Cuba, his
Administration’s policies and stance on the topic are unlikely to change over
time. The Cuban Government indicated in its statement that it believed as
much to be true.201 While President Trump can make changes to the Cuban
immigration policies at any time, he cannot repeal the Cuban Adjustment
Act. Since the CAA is a law enacted by Congress, a complete change in the
unique treatment of Cuban immigrants will require Congressional action.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the wet foot-dry foot policy was enforced, it was highly
controversial. The policy was merely a tool that the United States’
government implemented in light of the fact that it had no mechanism by
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which it could deport Cuban nationals. It was a legal fiction created by the
Clinton Administration to deal with the reality that the United States was
unable to send Cuban immigrants back to Cuba once they arrived here.
Because of that, the United States turned a negative situation into a positive
one by purporting that it was being generous to Cuban immigrants and
choosing to let them stay. The truth of the matter is that the Clinton
Administration had no choice because the Cuban government refused to
cooperate and repatriate its own citizens. As such, the United States was left
with no alternative but to implement the unprecedented policy of wet footdry foot.
Additionally, despite President Obama’s hope that ending wet foot-dry
foot would mean “treating Cuban migrants the same way we treat migrants
from other countries,”202 it still remains true today that Cuban immigrants are
treated differently than immigrants from any other nation. Despite the repeal
of the wet foot-dry foot policy and the establishment of a repatriation
agreement between Cuba and the United States, the Cuban Adjustment Act
is still in place. The CAA puts Cubans on a fast track to United States
citizenship. So long as this is the case, relations between Cuba and the United
States will remain strained, and the repatriation arrangement will be at risk.
Further adding to the strain in relations and endangering the repatriation
agreement is President Trump’s rhetoric and actions with regard to Cuban
policy. The United States has already seen a reversion in some aspects of the
policies toward Cuba. If these changes continue, the Cuban government will
surely revert to the days of refusing anyone the United States seeks to
repatriate. This could mean the return of wet foot-dry foot or some other
similar program that the United States will be forced to instate to justify its
inability to return Cuban citizens to the island nation.
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